Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has emerged as Taiwan’s loudest champion in the Caribbean, visiting Taipei a dozen times and publicly rebuking Beijing’s aggression. His speeches celebrate Taiwanese aid, democracy, and sovereignty. Yet, behind the fiery rhetoric lies a quieter, more calculated game: informal ties with mainland China, strategic meetings with Chinese envoys, and a willingness to engage Beijing economically while refusing to abandon Taipei. The result is a diplomatic two-step that balances loyalty, leverage, and political calculation.
Since 1981, SVG has recognized Taiwan, and under Gonsalves, that bond has strengthened. Taiwanese loans and aid have underpinned SVG’s development, with over EC$800 million invested in hospitals, schools, agriculture, and policing. Gonsalves has used this support as a political shield, warning that cutting ties would mean forfeiting essential development lifelines. He frames the alliance as existential, casting any opposition attempt to pivot to China as economic sabotage.
In regional forums and the UN, Gonsalves has slammed China’s military coercion and demanded respect for Taiwan. His loyalty has earned him accolades in Taipei, with President Tsai calling him a “true friend.” Taiwan’s support has also provided political capital at home. With elections looming in 2025, Gonsalves has turned foreign policy into a domestic wedge issue: he is the defender of Taiwan, while the opposition is portrayed as recklessly wooing Beijing.
However, recent events reveal the prime minister’s pragmatic streak. In March 2024, SVG (holding the rotating presidency of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, CELAC) hosted a major CELAC summit. Gonsalves invited China – an official observer of CELAC – to attend the summit, despite SVG not recognizing Beijing. His rationale: 26 of CELAC’s 33 member countries have ties with Beijing, and he “can’t put SVG’s national policy regarding Taiwan above them”. In other words, he wouldn’t let his pro-Taiwan stance isolate SVG from its regional neighbors.
Not only did Gonsalves welcome the Chinese delegation to that summit – he even quietly held a private breakfast meeting with a Chinese government representative who requested a sit-down. The Prime Minister was cagey about which envoy he met, but afterwards he portrayed the talks as entirely routine. “We do not have diplomatic relations, but we have good relations,” Gonsalves said, describing an “excellent discussion on a wide range of issues”.
During that conversation, by Gonsalves’ own account, he was frank about the elephant in the room: Taiwan. He says he told the Chinese envoy that SVG would be willing to have official relations with “Mainland China” – but only if Beijing would drop its demand that SVG first break ties with Taiwan. “If they say tomorrow morning [that] you have relations with Taiwan but you could also have relations with us, we are with them,” he recounted on a local radio program. He stressed that SVG has “no antipathy” toward China; the only problem is Beijing’s own policy.
Beijing quickly rebuked the suggestion, reaffirming its strict One-China policy. But Gonsalves’ comments show he is willing to engage Beijing, so long as he can maintain plausible deniability and political cover. He highlights ongoing cooperation with China in multilateral institutions, praises Chinese civilization, and even welcomes Chinese trade and investment—all without formal ties.
Diplomatic scolding aside, Gonsalves has continued to cultivate pragmatic dealings with China where he can. He notes that SVG already works with the PRC in many arenas short of formal ties: both countries sit together on bodies like the World Bank and IMF; China is a major non-borrowing member of the Caribbean Development Bank (where SVG is a borrower); and when SVG held a seat on the UN Security Council in 2020-21, Gonsalves’ diplomats “worked with” China’s representatives on various global issues. In Gonsalves’ eyes, this is just sophisticated statecraft – cooperating where interests align while “respectfully disagreeing” on Taiwan.
He even goes out of his way to profess admiration for Chinese civilization and history, casting the 1949 split between Beijing and Taipei as a family matter for the Chinese people to solve among themselves. “I’m interested in peace across the Taiwan Straits,” he likes to say – projecting himself as a moderate voice who, despite standing by Taiwan politically, harbors no hostility toward Beijing or the mainland Chinese people. It’s a carefully crafted image: the elder Caribbean statesman who can quote Chinese history and welcome Beijing’s emissaries to breakfast, but who stops short of formal ties out of loyalty to his “principles.”
Unsurprisingly, critics see all this as classic hedging. After all, keeping lines open to the world’s second-largest economy is just common sense for a small island state. SVG may officially spurn Beijing, but China’s economic footprint is already present in the country. The PRC is St. Vincent’s third-largest import partner and has quietly invested in local businesses and infrastructure projects even without an embassy in Kingstown. Beijing has extended grants for disaster relief and development to SVG and other Eastern Caribbean states. Chinese companies and entrepreneurs operate in St. Vincent, from construction ventures to small retail shops, riding a broader wave of Chinese commerce and migration in the Caribbean. Gonsalves is surely aware that Chinese money talks – many of SVG’s neighbors that flipped recognition to Beijing were quickly rewarded with glossy new stadiums, highways or soft loans. By engaging China informally, Gonsalves signals that SVG can enjoy some of the economic perks of partnership with Beijing (trade, investment, tourism) without abandoning Taiwan. It’s a delicate balance: embrace Taipei for official aid and solidarity, but quietly accommodate China’s regional influence so as not to miss out on opportunities. In effect, Gonsalves has been trying to dance with both partners at once.
Domestically, this strategy shores up Gonsalves’ reelection bid. By contrasting his “principled” Taiwan stance with the opposition’s openness to China, he paints himself as the stable, loyal leader. He warns that switching ties could trigger a recall of Taiwan’s loans, collapsing SVG’s economy. Meanwhile, he showcases Taiwan-funded infrastructure projects as proof of his effective diplomacy.
Still, the contradictions are stark. One moment Gonsalves accuses China of election interference and funding his opponents. The next, he praises Chinese diplomacy and recounts friendly meetings with PRC officials. Such inconsistency leaves SVG walking a diplomatic tightrope, risking alienation from both capitals.
For now, Taiwan tolerates Gonsalves’ flirtation with Beijing, likely recognizing the strategic value of retaining a vocal ally. But as China’s global clout expands and Taiwan’s diplomatic space contracts, this tolerance may wear thin. Gonsalves’ approach offers short-term gains but cannot be sustained indefinitely without consequences.
In the end, Gonsalves’ diplomatic two-step reflects the broader challenge facing small states in a polarized world. By navigating between Taipei and Beijing, he has reaped aid, attention, and influence. Yet this delicate act grows riskier by the day. Whether his legacy will be that of a master tactician or an opportunist may depend on how long he can keep both partners dancing to his tune.
